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Abstract
TAC-02 was the third in a series of Trading Agent Competition events fostering research in automating trading strategies by
showcasing alternate approaches in an open-invitation market game. TAC presents a challenging travel-shopping scenario
where agents must satisfy client preferences for complementary and substitutable goods by interacting through a variety of
market types. Michigan’s entry, Walverine, bases its decisions on a competitive (Walrasian) analysis of the TAC travel economy.
Using this Walrasian model, we construct a decision-theoretic formulation of the optimal bidding problem, which Walverine
solves in each round of bidding for each good. Walverine’s optimal bidding approach, as well as several other features of its
overall strategy, are potentially applicable in a broad class of trading environments.
D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The annual Trading Agent Competition (TAC)
provides a periodic forum for exploring the interaction
of strategies for a challenging market game. The
original motivation for TAC was to encourage agent
researchers interested in trading to focus on a common
problem, involving multiple interrelated goods traded
simultaneously in a strategically complex setting [23].
The TAC series has succeeded in attracting significant
participation (approximately 20 entries per year, a
majority of which clearly reflect a substantial effort),
and most importantly, producing a sizable body of
ideas and results as reflected in over a dozen pub-
lished reports to date.1
After operating the competition for its first 2 years,
the University of Michigan entered TAC for the first
time in 2002. TAC-02, organized by the Swedish
Institute of Computer Science (SICS), was held in
Edmonton, Canada, in July. The field of 19 entrants
included many strong contenders from the previous
year [25]—several of which were significantly im-
proved [8]—as well as some newcomers.
Our agent, ‘‘Walverine’’, gets its name from the
University of Michigan team mascot (the wolver-
ine—a variety of weasel), and Le´on Walras, the
19th-century economist who first envisioned the
concept of interacting markets in price equilibrium
[22]. Walverine’s overall approach can be character-
ized as ‘‘competitive analysis’’—forming expecta-
0167-9236/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2003.10.005
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tions based on a model where agents behave as if
their actions have no effect on prices [1]. From such
assumptions about the other agents’ behavior, Wal-
verine formulates a decision-theoretic model of its
bidding problem, and issues its offers accordingly.
Embodying the competitive analysis approach in a
software trading agent has led us to develop several
novel techniques. Although worked out in detail
specifically for the TAC environment, we expect that
the underlying ideas will prove applicable to a broad
range of trading contexts.
2. Trading agent competition
2.1. TAC rules
The TAC game presents a travel-shopping task,
where traders assemble flights, hotels, and entertain-
ment into trips for a set of eight probabilistically
generated clients. Clients are described by their pre-
ferred arrival and departure days (pa and pd), the
premium (hp) they are willing to pay to stay at the
‘‘Towers’’ (T) hotel rather than ‘‘Shanties’’ (S), and
their respective values (e1, e2, e3) for three different
types of entertainment events. The agents’ objective is
to maximize the value of trips for their clients, net of
expenditures in the markets for travel goods. The three
categories of goods are exchanged through distinct
market mechanisms.
2.1.1. Flights
A feasible trip includes air transportation both
ways, comprising an in-flight day i and out-flight
day j, 1V i< jV 5. Flights in and out each day are
sold independently, at prices determined by a stochas-
tic process. The initial price for each flight is f
U [250, 400] and follows a random walk thereafter
with an increasingly upward bias.
2.1.2. Hotels
Feasible trips must also include a room in one of
the two hotels for each night of the client’s stay. There
are 16 rooms available in each hotel each night, and
these are sold through ascending 16th-price auctions.
Agents submit bids for various quantities, specifying
the price offered for each additional unit. When the
auction closes, the units are allocated to the 16 highest
offers, with all bidders paying the price of the lowest
winning offer. Each minute, the hotel auctions issue
quotes, indicating the 16th-highest (ASK) and 17th-
highest (BID) prices among the currently active unit
offers [26]. Starting at minute 4, one of the hotel
auctions is selected at random to close, with the others
remaining active and open for bids.
Hotel bidders are also subject to a ‘‘beat-the-
quote’’ (BTQ) rule [27], requiring that any new bid
offer to purchase at least one unit at a price of
ASK+ 1, and at least as many units at ASK+ 1 as
the agent was previously winning at ASK.
2.1.3. Entertainment
Agents receive an initial random allocation of
entertainment tickets (indexed by type and day),
which they may allocate to their own clients or sell
to other agents through continuous double auctions
[6]. The entertainment auctions issue BID and ASK
quotes representing the highest outstanding buy and
lowest sell offer, respectively, and remain open for
buying and selling throughout the 12-min game du-
ration. A client may sell tickets that it does not own,
but must pay a penalty of 200 per ticket for any ‘‘short
sales’’ not covered by the end of the game.
A feasible client trip, r, is defined by an in-flight
day, inr, out-flight day, outr, hotel type (Hr, which is 1
if T and 0 if S), and entertainment types (Er, a subset
of {1, 2, 3}). The value of this trip is given by
vðrÞ ¼ 1000 100ðApa inrAþ Apd outrAÞ
þ hp  Hr þ
X
ieEr
ei: ð1Þ
At the end of a game instance, the TAC server
calculates the optimal allocation of trips to clients for
each agent, given the final holdings of flights, hotels,
and entertainment. The agent’s game score is its total
client trip utility minus net expenditures in the TAC
auctions.
2.2. Lessons from previous TAC events
In designing Walverine, we had the benefit of
learning from 2 years of observing the efforts of other
TAC agent designers [18,25]. We outline some of the
lessons that particularly influenced our thinking about
the competition.
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Firstly, agents are generally quite competent. Our
initial game design embedded several key issues we
thought relevant for agent strategy, and despite the
lack of prior discussion, most of the entrants recog-
nized these and moreover discovered others we did
not anticipate. The second year’s entrants explicitly
built on methods disclosed after the first competition
and disclosed these advances as well. Thus, there was
good reason to expect the agents to get better, and that
the level of competition would be especially high in
the final stage of the tournament.
Secondly, agents tend to improve dramatically
during the course of the tournament. At the time of
the preliminary rounds (qualifying and seeding),
entrants are still debugging their implementations
and refining their designs. Therefore, patterns ob-
served in early games may not be strong evidence
for behavior in the finals.
Thirdly, calculating optimal allocations and mar-
ginal valuations is feasible and important [10,19].
Finally, the hotel market is sufficiently competitive
that depending on prices to be reasonable without
even monitoring them is a viable strategy. This fact
was evidenced most dramatically by the success of
livingagents in TAC-01 [7,25].
3. Walverine framework
Based on these observations, we decided early on in
our design process to commit to the hypothesis that the
TAC domain resembles a competitive economy. That
is, we make a basic presumption that the aggregate
behavior of eight trading agents could be successfully
approximated by a model in which each behaves
according to the dictates of perfect competition. This
does not mean we literally believe that the agents act as
perfect competitors (they patently do not), nor that
they should. Indeed, a rational strategic agent should
take into account that its choices will affect prices, and
as described below, our Walverine attempts to do so.
Competitive behavior is merely a modeling assump-
tion chosen to balance accuracy and tractability.
One consequence of adopting a model of this sort is
that we did not depend substantially on empirical data
as input to our trading strategy. This is an advantage in
light of the observation above that the preliminary
rounds tend to differ qualitatively from the finals.
Although Walverine does have some free parameters
that could have benefited by tuning for performance,
we deliberately resisted this approach in favor of
maintaining a commitment to our analytical models.
3.1. Architecture
Walverine’s functional architecture is depicted in
Fig. 1. Dividing the agent into modular components
facilitated the development of Walverine’s strategy as
well as its software realization, especially given the
number of programmers involved (all of the coau-
thors). We partitioned the bidding decisions into one
strategy for flight and hotel acquisition, and another
for entertainment trading. Assuming the availability of
only one direct API connection to the TAC server, we
routed all bid messages and query results through a
local proxy standing between SICS and our trading
components. An optimization server answers queries
about optimal packages and marginal values to both
strategy components, given information about trans-
actions, and actual and predicted prices. There is no
direct communication between the flight/hotel and
entertainment modules; rather, all information is
passed implicitly through the optimizer. That is,
answers to optimization queries submitted by one
module reflect state information set by the other in
performing its own optimization queries.
The discussion below focuses on flight and hotel
bidding which dominates the game and exemplifies
our competitive analysis approach. Walverine’s enter-
tainment strategy takes a completely different tack as
discussed in Section 7.
3.2. Skeletal trading strategy
Analysis early in the design process suggested that
it was not worthwhile to delay flight purchases, as the
Fig. 1. Walverine architecture.
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expected price increase exceeded the likely benefit of
improved hotel information by the time hotels begin
to close and reveal meaningful prices. Therefore,
Walverine commits to flights as soon as possible
based on an assessment of expected optimal trips.
Specifically, upon game start, Walverine retrieves
client information and initial flight prices. It then
generates an initial prediction of hotel prices (details
in Section 4) and calculates the optimal trip at these
prices. It then issues bids immediately to purchase the
flights for these trips. In the TAC-02 finals, Walverine
purchased all 16 flights within the first 4 s of the
game, on average.
After the initial flight purchases, decision making
is effectively divided into discrete rounds, delimited
by the release of hotel price quotes each minute, with
one random hotel auction closing each minute starting
at minute 4. Therefore, at 3:00 and each minute mark
thereafter, Walverine executes its flight/hotel bidding-
round routine which comprises the following se-
quence of steps:
1. Update price quotes and holdings for flights and
hotels.
2. Recalculate hotel price predictions based on
updated information.
3. Recalculate optimal package, and purchase any
indicated flights beyond those currently held.
4. Calculate marginal values of hotel rooms.
5. Generate hotel bids based on these marginal values.
Price quotes and holding information (transactions)
are retrieved directly from the TAC server. Walver-
ine’s methods for price prediction and bid generation
are discussed in Sections 4 and 6, respectively. Cal-
culating optimal packages and marginal values is the
domain of our optimization server as discussed in the
Section 3.3.
3.3. Optimal packages and marginal values
Walverine’s formulation of the trip optimization
problem takes the general form:
max
r
vðrÞ  cðr; pˆÞ; ð2Þ
where v(r) =Si = 1
8 v(ri), for ri the trip assigned to client
i, with v(ri) given by Eq. (1) specialized for this client.
The expression c(r,pˆ) captures the cost of purchasing
any travel goods (flights, hotels, entertainment) re-
quired for trips, r, beyond the agent’s holdings at
estimated or actual prices pˆ. Unavailable items (i.e.,
closed hotels) are considered to have an effective price
of l.
This optimization problem can be expressed as an
integer linear program [19]. We formulate the model
in AMPL [5] and calculate the results using the
CPLEX solver.2 Walverine’s optimization server
wraps this optimization core with an interface for
setting parameters and issuing queries, communicat-
ing with the strategy components through sockets.
Queries supported by the optimization server
include:
Best package
Return the optimal package of goods, given current
holdings and estimated or actual prices. This
addresses the completion problem [4] which has come
to be recognized as a core problem in TAC bidding.3
Marginal value
Calculate the marginal (incremental) value of each
additional unit of available goods. The server accom-
modates separate queries for hotel and entertainment
goods.
We describe ‘‘hedged’’ variants on these queries in
Section 5.
Let v*( g,x) denote the value of the best package,
assuming we hold x additional units of good g, and
taking pˆg =l. The marginal value
4 of the kth unit of
g is simply v*( g,k) v*( g,k 1). The standard mar-
ginal-value query for hotels performs this calculation
for every open hotel, 1V kV 8. The marginal-value
query for entertainment performs it for every enter-
tainment good, k = 0 and k= 1.
2 http://www.ilog.com.
3 Walverine’s best-package query actually solves a special case,
the acquisition problem [4], as it accounts for opportunities to buy
goods at (estimated) prices but neglects the possibility of selling
entertainment. Note that our version employs linear prices in
contrast with the more general priceline approach in which the agent
faces varying estimated prices depending on the number of units
demanded.
4 Several previous TAC agents employed some concept of
marginal value [2,18,19], although the technical definitions applied
have varied substantially.
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4. Price prediction
Walverine predicts hotel prices based on a literal
application of its presumption that TAC markets are
competitive. Specifically, it calculates the Walrasian
competitive equilibrium of the TAC economy, defined
as the set of prices at which all markets would clear,
assuming all agents behave as price takers, i.e., behave
competitively [13]. Because flight prices are exoge-
nous, it is only hotel prices that may adjust to balance
supply and demand. Walverine attempts to find a set of
hotel prices that would support such an equilibrium
and returns these values as its prediction for the hotels’
final prices.
4.1. Calculating competitive equilibrium
Let p be a vector of hotel prices, consisting of
elements ph,i denoting the price of hotel type h a {S,
T} on day i a {1, 2, 3, 4} Let xh,i
j (p) denote agent j’s
demand for hotel h, day i at these prices, with its vector
of such demands written as x j(p). The aggregate
demand is simply the sum of agent demands x(p) =Sj
x j (p).
Demand for a given hotel is a function of all
hotel prices, as changing the price of any hotel can
affect the agent’s choice of trips, and thus the
demand for any other hotel. The interconnection of
markets renders this a problem in general equilibri-
um (as opposed to partial equilibrium) and prevents
us from analyzing each hotel in isolation.
Note that an agent’s demand also depends on flight
prices as well as its clients’ preferences. We leave these
factors implicit in our notation because both flight
prices and preferences are considered constant with
respect to the equilibrium calculation. We provide full
detail on our demand calculations in Section 4.2.
Prices, p, constitute a competitive equilibrium if
aggregate demand equals aggregate supply for all
hotels. Because there are 16 rooms available for each
hotel on each day, we have in competitive equilibrium
x(p) = 16.
General equilibrium theory develops technical con-
ditions on agent preferences under which such an
equilibrium can be guaranteed to exist [13,14]. How-
ever, these conditions do not hold in the TAC environ-
ment, and, indeed, the TAC economymay not possess a
competitive equilibrium. Reasons include the funda-
mental discreteness and satiability of agents’ demands
for hotel rooms. Nevertheless, we may still expect to
find approximate equilibria (that is, prices inducing
relatively small imbalances of supply and demand),
and these may serve adequately for our prediction
purpose.
The classic method for determining competitive
prices is the tatonnement protocol, an iterative price
adjustment procedure originally conceived by Walras
[1]. Tatonnement begins with an arbitrary price vector
and revises price elements respectively up or down as
there is an excess of demand or supply. This procedure
is guaranteed to converge on equilibrium prices when
they exist, assuming in addition that demand obeys the
gross substitutes property [14]. In the TAC domain,
however, preferences for hotel rooms exhibit strong
complementarities. This represents a patent violation
of gross substitutes, as raising the price for one hotel
can easily decrease demand for another, e.g., in the
case of two hotels of the same type on adjacent days.
Notwithstanding these theoretical impediments,
Walverine searches for a competitive equilibrium us-
ing tatonnement. Starting from an initial guess, p0, it
iteratively computes a revised price vector according
to:
ptþ1 ¼ pt þ atðxðptÞ  16Þ: ð3Þ
We experimented with several schemes for vary-
ing the adjustment rate, a, settling on an exponential
decay. The process tended to converge quickly on an
approximate equilibrium with no detectable sensitiv-
ity to particular parameter choices. The version
employed in the TAC-02 tournament happened to
set at = 0.3870.95t. We ran tatonnement for 300
iterations, although the bulk of the adjustment gen-
erally occurred within the first 10% of that.
4.2. Calculating expected demand
A central part of the tatonnement update [Eq. (3)] is
the determination of demand as a function of prices.
This is straightforward if client preferences are known,
as it corresponds essentially to an instance of the best-
package query described in Section 3.3.5 Whereas we
5 Indeed, we originally validated our prediction concept by
applying it to data from the TAC-01 finals, taking the client
preferences as given.
S.-F. Cheng et al. / Decision Support Systems 39 (2005) 169–184 173
do know the preferences of our own eight clients, we
have no direct knowledge about the 56 clients assigned
to the other seven agents.
Therefore, we partition the demand problem into a
component from Walverine (xw) and one from the
other agents:
xðpÞ ¼ xwðpÞ þ xw¯ðpÞ:
We calculate xw(p) using a simplified version of the
best-package query (ignoring entertainment holdings).
In place of xw¯(p), we attempt to estimate its expecta-
tion, exploiting our knowledge of the distribution
from which client preferences are drawn. If agent
demand is separable by client,
E½xw¯ðpÞ ¼ E
X56
i¼1
xclientiðpÞ
" #
: ð4Þ
Because client preferences are i.i.d.,
E½xw¯ðpÞ ¼ 56  E½xclientðpÞ:
At the beginning of the game when there are no
holdings of flights and hotels, the agent optimization
problem is indeed separable by client, and so Eq. (4) is
justified. At interim points when agents hold goods,
the demand optimization problem is no longer sepa-
rable. However, because we are ignorant about the
holdings of other agents, we have no particular basis
on which to determine how Eq. (4) is violated, and so
we adopt it as an approximation.
It remains to derive a value for E[xclient(p)]. Our
solution follows directly from the distribution of
clients. Preferred arrival and departure days (pa,pd)
are drawn uniformly from the 10 possible arrival/
departure pairs:
E½xclientðpÞ ¼ 0:1
X
ðpa;pdÞ
E½ðxÞpa;pdðpÞ: ð5Þ
For a given (pa,pd), the only remaining uncertainty
surrounds the hotel premium hp. We observe that the
optimal choice of travel days is independent of hp but
conditional on hotel choice. Given its hotel type, the
hotel premium received by the client is either constant
(for T) or zero (for S), regardless of the specific days
of stay.
Let r*(pa,pd,h) denote the optimal trip for the
specified day preferences, conditional on staying in
hotel h (Tor S). We can calculate this trip by taking into
account the flight prices, prices for hotel h, day devi-
ation penalties, and expected entertainment bonus (see
Section 4.3). Note that the optimal trip for preferences
(pa,pd) must be either r*(pa,pd,T) or r*(pa,pd,S). Let
rh denote the net valuation of r*(pa,pd,h), based on the
factors above but not accounting for hp.
Hotel premiums are also drawn uniformly, hpf
U [50, 150]. Because T and S differ only in the bonus
hp, we can determine the choice based on the relation
of rT and rS:
h ¼
S if rS  rTz150
T if rS  rTV50
8<
:
If 50 < rS rT < 150 instead, then the choice of
hotel depends on the actual hp. The uniform distribu-
tion of hp entails that the probability of S being the
optimal choice is
Prðh ¼ SÞ ¼ rS  rT  50
100
:
Given the choice of trip days and hotel, the demand
for this case is established. We aggregate these cases
(weighting by probability of hotel choice if applica-
ble) using Eq. (5), yielding the overall demand per
client. Multiplying by 56 gives us E[xw¯(p)], and
combining with our own demand, finally, the overall
expected demand estimate.
4.3. Expected entertainment surplus
The derivation above deferred the detailed expli-
cation of our accounting for entertainment bonuses in
evaluating alternative trips. We employ estimates of
net entertainment contribution as a function of arrival
and departure days. Our analysis is based on the
distribution of client entertainment preferences, along
with the empirical observation (reported by the liv-
ingagents team [7]) that entertainment tickets tend to
trade at a price near 80. We verified that this indeed
obtained during the TAC-01 finals and refined the
estimate by distinguishing the entertainment tickets
on congested days 2 and 3 (average price 85.49),
from tickets on less congested days 1 and 4 (average
price 76.35). Our analysis proceeds by assuming that
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agents can buy or sell any desired quantity at these
prices.
Consider a client staying for n days with given
entertainment values. Its maximal entertainment sur-
plus would be obtained by allocating its most valuable
ticket to the cheapest day of its trip if profitable (that is,
if the entertainment value exceeds the average price for
that day), then if nz 2, its second most valuable to the
next cheapest day, and finally, if nz 3, its least
valuable to a remaining day.
Let xi denote the cost of the ith least expensive day
for the given trip 1 V i Vmin(3, n). The expected
entertainment surplus of the trip then is given by
Xminð3;nÞ
i¼1
EViðxiÞ; ð6Þ
where EVi(x) denotes the expected value of allocating
the ith most valuable ticket to a day costing x. Three
ticket values are drawn independently from a uniform
distribution. Given m i.i.d. draws fU[a,b], the ith
greatest is less than z with the probability [15]
F
½a;b
i;m ðzÞ ¼
Xi1
j¼0
m
j
0
@
1
A z a
b a
 mj b z
b a
 j
:
The expectation of this ith order statistic Z
½a;b
i;m is
given by
E Z
½a;b
i;m
h i
¼ aþ ðb aÞ 1 i
mþ 1
 
:
We need to determine the expected value of the ith
ticket, net of its cost x. The expected surplus of the
ith-order statistic with respect to x, given that x is
between the jth and ( j + 1)st order statistic (iV j), is
E Z
½a;b
i;m xAZ ½a;bjþ1;mVx<Z ½a;bj;m
h i
¼E Z ½x;bi;j  x
h i
: ð7Þ
The probability of the condition in Eq. (7) is
PrðZ ½a;bjþ1;mVx < Z ½a;bj;m Þ ¼ F ½a;bjþ1;mðxÞ  F ½a;bj;m ðxÞ:
Using these expressions, we can sum over the
possible positions of x with respect to the order
statistics (positions in which value minus cost is
positive) to find the expected value of allocating the
ith best ticket to a day costing x:
EViðxÞ ¼ E max 0; Z ½0;200i;3  x
 h i
¼
X3
j¼1
E Z
½x;200
i;j
h i
x
 
F
½0;200
jþ1;3 ðxÞF ½0;200j;3 ðxÞ
 
;
providing the value we need to evaluate the expected
entertainment surplus for a trip [Eq. (6)].
The results of these calculations for each of the 10
possible trips are presented in Table 1. In the 2002
competition, Walverine used the average prices from
the TAC-01 finals. It turned out that the entertainment
prices observed in the TAC-02 finals were somewhat
lower (averaging 74.31 on days 2 and 3, 72.87 on
days 1 and 4), thus supporting greater entertainment
surplus.
4.4. Interim price prediction
The description above covers Walverine’s proce-
dure for initial price prediction. Once the game is
underway, there are several additional factors to
consider.
	 Agents already hold flight and hotel goods.
	 Flight prices have changed.
	 Hotel auctions have issued price quotes providing a
source of information about actual demand.
	 Some hotel auctions are closed precluding further
acquisition of these rooms.
Table 1
Expected contributions from entertainment based on prices from
TAC-01 and TAC-02 finals, respectively
Arrive:depart Expected entertainment surplus
TAC-01 prices TAC-02 prices
1:2, 4:5 74.7 78.0
1:3, 3:5 101.5 112.1
1:4, 2:5 106.9 119.9
1:5 112.7 120.9
2:3, 3:4 66.2 76.6
2:4 93.0 110.7
Walverine employs these summary values in its demand
calculations.
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Walverine adopts a fairly minimal adjustment of its
basic (initial) price prediction method to address these
factors. In calculating its own demand for open hotels,
it takes into account its current holdings of flights and
closed hotels. For closed hotels, Walverine fixes its
own demand at actual holdings. For other agents, it
continues to employ initial flight prices in best-trip
calculations. Because we do not know the holdings of
other agents, we make no attempt to account for this in
estimating their demand. This applies even to closed
hotels—in the absence of information about their
allocation, Walverine’s tatonnement calculations at-
tempt to balance supply and demand for these as well.
Given price quotes, we modify the price-adjust-
ment process to employ ASK (or final price of closed
auctions) as a lower-bound price for each hotel. This
constraint is enforced within each iteration of the
tatonnement update [Eq. (3)].
4.5. Prediction quality
After the TAC-02 finals, we undertook a compre-
hensive comparative study of price-prediction meth-
ods employed by the participating agents. The results
of this study are presented in a separate report [24].
The investigation confirmed that Walverine was the
only entry that did not employ statistics on past prices.
Nevertheless, the study indicated that Walverine’s
equilibrium method produced initial price predictions
more accurate than those of any other TAC-02 agent
with the exception of ATTac-01. Walverine was com-
parable in accuracy (better on one measure, worse on
another) with ATTac-01 which employs a sophisticat-
ed machine learning approach based on boosting [16].
On the other hand, we did not systematically
evaluate the quality of interim price predictions and
suspect that Walverine has considerable room for
improvement there. In principle, price quotes provide
significant evidential value regarding uncertain de-
mand, and Walverine fails to exploit this information
directly in these terms.
5. Price hedging
Walverine’s equilibrium analysis results in a point
price prediction for each hotel auction. In reality,
prices are inherently uncertain, and thus decisions
about bidding and trip choice should take into account
the potential deviations from any point estimate. Some
agents, such as ATTac [16] and RoxyBot [9], explic-
itly generate and use predictions in the form of
distributions over prices. Others, including Walverine,
generate point predictions but then make decisions
with respect to distributions around those estimates.
The greatest source of risk stems from the possi-
bility that a hotel’s price might greatly exceed the
estimate, causing the agent to pay a painfully high
price or fail to obtain its room(s). Thus, Walverine
assigns a small outlier probability, p, to the event that
a given hotel will reach an unanticipated high price. In
the event the hotel is an outlier, we take its price to be
max(2pˆ, 400), where pˆ is the estimated price of the
hotel if it is not an outlier (i.e., according to the
equilibrium price-prediction procedure as described
above). Walverine’s overall price distribution is thus
defined by a set of disjoint events with exactly one
outlier, at probability p for each of the open hotel
auctions, and the residual probability for the event of
no outliers.
We apply this price distribution model in our initial
calculation of optimal trips, on which we base our
starting flight purchases. The resulting choice hedges
for the potential that some price will deviate signifi-
cantly from our baseline prediction. The typical effect
of our hedging method is to reduce the duration of
some trips, thus decreasing Walverine’s exposure to
hotel price risk.
Walverine’s optimizer employs this same outlier
model in computing responses to its hedged marginal
value query. A hedged marginal value is simply a
weighted average of marginal values, where v* is
calculated with respect to each outlier event (as well
as the no-outlier event), with the results weighted
according to the outlier probability p. Because it
involves repeated optimization with respect to a variety
of price and quantity combinations, hedged marginal
value is the most computationally intensive operation
performed by Walverine.
In the TAC-02 tournament, Walverine employed the
setting p = 0.06. This is one of the few free parameters
in its flight/hotel strategy, along with the outlier price
expression itself. Although we made no systematic
effort to tune this parameter, we did verify empirically
that p = 0.06 significantly outperformed p = 0 (im-
provement was on the order of 300 points per game).
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6. Optimal bidding
An agent behaving competitively would bid in
hotel auctions by offering to buy units at their
marginal values. Again assuming separable clients,
this means that each agent will submit an offer for a
unit at marginal value for each hotel and each client.
Under price uncertainty, the bidding decision problem
is more complicated [9], but a competitive agent
would still not take into account its own effect on
prices.
Walverine assumes that other agents bid competi-
tively and itself bids strategically by calculating an
optimal set of bids taking into account its own effect on
hotel prices. This amounts to placing bids that maxi-
mize our expected surplus given a distribution from
which other bids in the auction are drawn.
6.1. Generating bid distributions
As for our price-prediction algorithm, we model the
seven other agents as 56 individual clients, again using
the zero-holdings assumption to render the computa-
tion tractable. Our approach is to generate a distribution
of marginal valuations assuming each of the (pa,pd)
pairs, and sum over the 10 cases to generate an overall
distribution Val for the representative client.
For a given (pa,pd) pair, we estimate the value of a
given room (h,i) as the difference in expected net
valuation between the best trip, assuming room (h,i)
is free, and the best trip of the alternative hotel type hV.
In other words, the value of a given room is estimated to
be the price above which the client would prefer to
switch to the best trip using the alternate hotel type.
Setting the price of (h,i) to zero and that of all other
hotels to predicted prices, we calculate best packages
r*(pa,pd,h), r*(pa,pd,hV) and their associated net
valuations rh and rhV as in Section 4.2. If (h,i)gr*
(pa,pd,h), we say that Valh is zero;
6 otherwise, it is
the expected difference in net valuations:
ValS ¼ maxð0; rS  rT  hpÞ;
ValT ¼ maxð0;rT  rS þ hpÞ:
Because hpfU [50, 150], these expressions rep-
resent uniform random variables:
rS  rT  hpfU ½rS  rT  150; rS  rT  50;
rT  rS þ hpfU ½rT  rS þ 50; rT  rS þ 150:
ð8Þ
For each (pa,pd), we can thus construct a cumu-
lative distribution, Valpa,pd, representing the marginal
valuation of a given hotel room. In general, Valpa,pd
will include a mass at zero, representing the case
where the room is not used even if free. Thus, we
have
Valpa;pdðxÞ ¼
0 if x < maxð0; aÞ
xa
ba if maxð0; aÞVxVb
1 if xzb
8>><
>>>:
where a and b are the lower and upper bounds,
respectively, of the corresponding uniform distribu-
tion of Eq. (8).
The overall valuation distribution for a representa-
tive client is the sum over arrival/departure preferences,
ValðxÞ ¼ 1
10
X
ðpa;pdÞ
Valpa;pdðxÞ:
Finally, it will also prove useful to define a
valuation distribution conditional on exceeding a
given value q. For xz q,
ValðxAqÞ ¼ ValðxÞ  ValðqÞ
1 ValðqÞ : ð9Þ
6.2. Computing optimal bids
After estimating a bid distribution, Walverine
derives an optimal set of bids with respect to this
distribution. Our calculation makes use of an order
statistic, Valk,n(x), which represents the probability
that a given value, x, would be kth highest if inserted
into a set of n independent draws from Val.
Valk;nðxÞ ¼ ½1 ValðxÞk1ValðxÞnkþ1
n
k  1
0
@
1
A
6 As for r, we omit the arguments for pa, pd, and day i where
these are apparent from context.
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We can also define the conditional order statistic,
Valk,n(x | q), by substituting the conditional valuation
distribution in Eq. (9) for Val in the definition above.
Once hotel auctions start issuing price quotes, we
have additional information about the distribution of
bids. If H is the hypothetical quantity won for Wal-
verine at the time of the last issued quote, the current
ASK tells us that there are 16H bids from other
clients at or above ASK, and 56 (16H) = 40 +H
at or below (assuming a bid from every client,
including zero bids). We therefore define another
order statistic, Bk, corresponding to the kth highest
bid, sampling 16H bids from Val( | ASK) as de-
fined by Eq. (9), and 40 +H bids from Val.
Note that our order statistics are defined in terms of
other agents’ bids, but we are generally interested in
the kth highest value in an auction overall. Let nb be
the number of our bids in the auction greater than b.
We define Bk so as to include our own bids and
employ the (k nb)th order statistic on others,
Valk nb,n(b), in calculating Bk.
Given our definitions, the probability that a bid b
will be the kth highest is the following:
BkðbÞ ¼
Xknb1
i¼0
Vali;16HðbÞ Valknbi;40þH ðbAASKÞ:
ð10Þ
We characterize the expected value of submitting a
bid at price b as a combinationof the following
statistics, all defined in terms of Bk.
	 B16(b): Probability that b will win and set the price.
	 B15+ uSi = 115 Bi(b): Probability that b will win but not
set the price.
	 M15u {xjSi = 115 Pi(x) = 0.5}: Median price if we
submit an offer b.
	 M16u {xjSi = 116 Pi(x) = 0.5}: Median price if we do
not bid.
Before proceeding, we assess the quality of our
model by computing the probability that the 16th bid
would be above the quote given our distributions. If
this probability is sufficiently low: [B16
+ (ASK) < 0.02],
then we deem our model of other agents’ bidding to
be invalid and we revert to our most conservative bid:
our own marginal value.
If the conditional bid distribution passes our test,
based on these statistics, we can evaluate the expected
utility, EU, of a candidate bid for a given unit, taking
into consideration the marginal value, MV, of the unit
to Walverine, and the number of units, nb, of this good
for which we have bids greater than b. Expected utility
of a bid also reflects the expected price that will be
paid for the unit, as well as the expected effect the bid
will have on the price paid for all our higher bids in this
auction. Lacking an expression for expected prices
conditional on bidding, we employ as an approxima-
tion the median price statistics, M15 and M16, defined
above.7
EUðbÞ ¼ B16ðbÞ½ðMV bÞ  nbðbM16Þ
þ Bþ15ðbÞ½ðMVM15Þ  nbðM15 M16Þ
Walverine’s proposed offer for this unit is the bid value
maximizing expected utility,
b* ¼ argmax
b
EUðbÞ; ð11Þ
which we calculate by simple enumeration of candi-
date bids (restricted to integers).
6.3. Beat-the-quote adjustments
Upon calculating desired offer prices for all units
of a given hotel, Walverine assembles them into an
overall bid vector for the auction, taking the beat-the-
quote rule (BTQ) into consideration. BTQ dictates
that if the hypothetical quantity won for an agent’s
current bid is H, any replacement bid for that auction
must represent an offer to buy at least H units at a
price at least ASK+ 1. For example, suppose the
current bid offers to pay (200, 150, 50) for three
units, respectively, of a given hotel room. If ASK=
100, then the agent is winning its first two units (i.e.,
H = 2). To satisfy BTQ, the agent’s new bid must be at
least (101, 101).
Let b=(b1,. . .,b8) be the agent’s current bid for the
eight potentially valuable units in this auction (bi = 0
corresponds to no offer for that unit), and let bV be the
proposed new bid, derived according to the optimiza-
7 Offline analysis using Monte Carlo simulation verified that
the approximation is reasonable.
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tion procedure in Eq. (11). To ensure satisfaction of
BTQ, the agent could submit the modified bid
bW ¼ ðmaxðbV1 ;ASK þ 1Þ; . . . ;maxðbVH ;ASK þ 1Þ;
bVHþ1; . . . ; b8Þ:
However, this may not be a wise solution. Consider
b=(200, 150, 50, 0,. . .) as in the example above, but
with ASK= 150 (equal to the agent’s lowest winning
bid), and desired new bid bV=(500, 0,. . .). In this
situation, the agent would like to revise upward its
offer for the first unit, but would prefer that its offer of
150 for the second unit were outbid by another agent.
Considering that other agents also follow BTQ, there
will likely be several new bids at a price of ASK+ 1 in
the next round of bidding, meaning that an unrevised
bid of 150 stands a much better chance of being
outbid than does a revised bid of 151. In this case,
the agent must balance the desirability of revising its
bid for the first unit against its aversion to increasing
its offer for the second.
Walverine decides whether to revise its bid based
on a crude comparison of these factors. It assesses the
value of bidding in terms of the magnitude of its
desired price changes that are allowed by BTQ, and
the cost of bidding in terms of the amount by which
BTQ requires bidding above actual value. If this latter
value exceeds the former, or a constant threshold, then
Walverine refrains from submitting a revised bid.
Otherwise, it submits bU.
6.4. Analysis
Using game data from the TAC-02 finals, we tested
the utility of our bidding algorithm as well as the
accuracy of the bid distributions. Informal analysis
reveals that our distributions systematically underes-
timate the actual values of the bids. It appears that the
distributions are fairly accurate during the initial
stages of the game, when our modeling assumptions
hold (zero holdings, all auctions open). The deterio-
ration in accuracy of our distributions is not a fatal
problem, as our algorithm reverts to bidding marginal
values when the observed price quote is judged very
unlikely with respect to our estimates. Of course,
more accurate distributions would enable more effec-
tive bid optimization.
Toward this end, we devised an alternative bid
estimation scheme, intended to correct for some of the
invalid simplifying assumptions underlying our orig-
inal method.8 It turned out that, for the TAC-02 finals
at least, the alternative distributions more closely
resemble the actual distribution of bids.
To test whether the more accurate estimates actu-
ally support improved bidding, we devised a measure
based on past data that determines the effectiveness of
a set of bids with respect to predicted prices and other
agents’ actual bids. For each open hotel in each
bidding round, we calculated our winnings in that
auction based on various bidding strategies and the
actual bids placed by other agents. We then scored
each hypothetical outcome under the assumption that
rooms in other open hotels were available at predicted
prices.
We used this method to score bids over 256
closings (32 games times eight bidding rounds)
from the TAC-02 finals, generating 1152 data points
(4.5 open hotels in average bidding round). Surpris-
ingly, bidding based on our original, nominally less
accurate distributions produced superior results, to
both marginal-value bidding and bidding based on
the more accurate new distribution. However, a
mean-difference test did not reveal the differences
to be statistically significant. Future work will
further test and refine our model of other agents’
bid distributions.
7. Entertainment trading
Walverine’s approach to entertainment trading can
be considered a polar opposite of the competitive
analysis approach it takes to flight and hotel buying.
Equilibrium analysis has little to say about the dy-
namics of prices produced through continuous auc-
tions, yet these transient behaviors seem particularly
salient for effective entertainment trading. Thus, for
this domain, we employ no model of the market and
no explicit calculations of the expected outcomes of
alternative bid choices. Instead, Walverine adopts a
8 We forgo detailed specification, as this redesign effort is still
in flux.
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model-free, empirical approach called Q-learning—a
variety of reinforcement learning [20].
7.1. Learning framework
The idea of applying Q-learning to TAC strategies
was proposed by Boadway and Precup [3] and was
employed in their TAC-01 entry. This agent attempted
to learn a policy for the entire TAC game, but this
proved very ambitious given the time available for
development and training. Inspired by their example,
we sought to pursue this approach for the much more
limited TAC task of entertainment trading.
The aim of Q-learning is to estimate a function
Q : SA ! R, representing the value of taking a
given action in a given state. Value is typically
measured by (discounted) cumulative future rewards,
and the function can be represented in tabular or
implicit form. From the Q function, one can derive
an optimal policy, namely, that performing the max-
imally valued action in any given state. The recur-
rence (Bellman) equation relating values of adjacent
states provides the basis for updating Q from experi-
ence of taking actions and observing state transitions
and rewards.
Walverine’s entertainment component considers
each auction independently. We approximate the state
of an entertainment auction as the settings of six
parameters: BID, ASK, number of tickets held, mar-
ginal value of first unit (MV1), marginal value of
zeroth unit (MV0), and game time. To keep the state
space manageable, we discretized these dimensions
into value sets of size 6, 6, 3, 7, 7, and 3, respectively.
Marginal values provided by the optimizer summa-
rized client preferences and provided the necessary
link to our flight/hotel module.
The reward from entertainment has two compo-
nents: cash flow from trading and the entertainment
bonus accrued to clients at the end of the game. In
each entertainment auction, Walverine maintains an
offer to buy one unit, and an offer to sell one unit (at a
higher price, of course). Rather than take the offer
prices as actions, however, we define the action space
in terms of offsets from marginal value. That is, the
action buy(x) means to revise its current unit buy offer
to the price MV1 x. Similarly, sell(x) corresponds to
a sell offer at MV0 + x. We defined eight discrete
offset values. However, rather than consider all 64
buy/sell combinations, Walverine alternates between
buy and sell decisions, considering only the eight
available options for each case.
7.2. Learning results
Our learning procedure encodes Q as a table.
Walverine maintained two tables: one for entertain-
ment events on days {1, 4}, and the other for days {2,
3}. Within each category (six auctions apiece), the
learning agent shared its trading experience. Given the
size of each table (6291 states and 16 actions9),
Walverine required a great deal of training experience.
We ran the Q-learning algorithm over data gathered
from 14,839 games, including matches against other
TAC participants during preliminary rounds, as well
as many instances of self-play. Walverine employed a
variety of entertainment trading policies while gath-
ering experience, including a hard-coded strategy
based on the one reportedly employed by livingagents
in TAC-01 [7]. Once we had accumulated sufficient
data, we ran some instances of Walverine based on
preliminary learned policies, with various explora-
tion–exploitation control methods.
Fig. 2 displays a learning curve representing the
evolution of Walverine’s entertainment performance
during the training period. We took as a baseline the
value of the null (no-trading) strategy, which we
determined experimentally to provide an entertain-
Fig. 2. Entertainment learning curve.
9 There are 15,876 distinct combinations of state variables, but
many of these do not represent legal states. In all of its training,
Walverine actually experienced 2588 and 2602 states, respectively,
in the two auction categories.
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ment reward (through retaining endowed tickets) of
1019 on average. As a second baseline, we evaluated
the performance of the aforementioned livingagents
entertainment strategy embedded in Walverine. The
performance axis of Fig. 2 measures Walverine’s
learned entertainment strategy compared to this sec-
ond baseline. In each interval of training games
represented, we evaluate the policy learned based on
games prior to that interval (thus, the first interval
represents the no-trading baseline). The evaluation
consists of self-play games with half the agents
following the learned entertainment policy and the
other half following the livingagents entertainment
strategy. By the time of the TAC-02 finals, we had
reached within 50 points of the hand-coded strategy.
It is important to note that Walverine itself un-
derwent many changes during the learning process
which undoubtedly confounds the results. Moreover,
the policies evaluated in Fig. 2 retain an exploration
element, except the last interval which is pure
exploitation.
In the TAC-02 finals, Walverine averaged an
entertainment reward of 1409, nearly 400 over the
nonbidding baseline. A summary of entertainment
performance by agent is included in Table 2. Interest-
ingly, whitebear, the high scorer in TAC-02, was
extremely successful on entertainment, achieving an
average reward of 1623. Although Vetsikas and Sel-
man [21] report on employing a simple entertainment
strategy, the high payoff achieved suggests that there
may be room for improvement through further learn-
ing in this environment.
8. TAC-02 agent performance
8.1. Tournament results
Average scores for the eight agents that played in
the final round are posted in Table 2. See http://
www.sics.se/tac for a list of participant affiliations
and team leaders, as well as results from preliminary
and semifinal rounds. Complete game logs are avail-
able as for the previous TAC events.
Performance in the tournament is one relevant
measure of agent quality, although we agree with
those who have cautioned against focusing excessive-
ly on ranked results in the context of research com-
petitions [17]. One interesting question is how to
measure progress over time. The two top-scoring
agents in TAC-01, livingagents and ATTac-01, partic-
ipated with essentially unchanged agents in TAC-02.
As noted above, livingagents did quite well, assuming
we ignore the bug that caused it to skip two games.
ATTac was top scorer in the TAC-02 seeding rounds,
but then was eliminated in the semifinals. One possi-
ble explanation is that prices during the preliminary
rounds in 2002 (which ATTac uses as training data)
were not sufficiently representative of the final
rounds.10 However, we believe the relatively high
performance of other agents is also reflective of a
general increase in competence of the field.
The two top-scoring agents in TAC-02, whitebear
and SouthamptonTAC [11], also contended in TAC-
01. These agents reportedly evolved from their 2001
designs, improved through adopting refined classifi-
cations of game environments [12] and through ex-
tensive experimentation and parameter tuning [21].
8.2. TAC market efficiency
Another gauge of agent effectiveness is how well
they allocate travel goods, in the aggregate, through
their market interactions. We can measure this by
comparing actual TAC market allocations with ideal
global allocations. Consider the total group of 64
Table 2
Scores during the finals
Agent Final score CP Adjustment Entertainment
Whitebear 3413 + 66 1623
SouthamptonTAC 3385  48 1464
Thalis 3246  36 1393
UMBCTAC 3236 + 55 1327
Walverine 3210 + 67 1409
Livingagentsa 3181  20 1362
KavayaH 3099  60 1460
Cuhk 3069  24 1452
Each agent played 32 games. The second column represents our
calculated adjustment due to client preference assignments. The
third column presents the entertainment component of agent scores.
a The score of livingagents was adversely affected by missing
two games. Discounting these would have led to an average score of
3393.
10 We have recently verified (using data provided by Peter
Stone) that the prediction function learned by ATTac-01 indeed was
much more accurate than the predictions employed by ATTac in
2002. Whether due to the 2002 training data or a bug, we cannot tell
for sure.
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clients, and the set of available resources: 16 hotel
rooms of each type per day, plus eight entertainment
tickets of each type per day. The global optimizer
calculates the allocation of resources maximizing
total client utility—the net of expenditures on flights
assuming they are available at their initial prices.
Note that this optimization neglects hotel and enter-
tainment prices, as these are endogenous to the TAC
market. The average achievable net utility per client
in the various rounds of the TAC tournament, as
determined by global optimization, is reported under
the heading ‘‘Global’’ in Table 3. Average net utility
achieved in the actual TAC games (also neglecting
hotel and entertainment expenditures but counting
actual payments for flights) is reported under ‘‘TAC
Market’’.
As seen in the table, we found that the TAC market
achieved 89% of the optimal value, on average, over
the 32 games of the TAC-02 finals. There was a
steady improvement from the qualifying round (67%
optimal), seeding round (76%), and semifinals (88%).
It is difficult to assess this effectiveness in absolute
terms, so we provide a couple of benchmarks for
comparison. In ‘‘Uniform H +E’’, we distribute the
hotel rooms and entertainment evenly across the eight
agents, then optimize each agent’s allocation to cli-
ents. This approach yields 95% of the globally opti-
mal value. The relative value drops to around 85% if
we distribute only the hotels, leaving agents with their
original endowment of entertainment. It is perhaps
surprising that simply dividing the goods uniformly
achieves such a high fraction of the available sur-
plus—better than the market if entertainment is in-
cluded in the distribution.
One reason that the uniform distribution is rela-
tively so effective is that the agents are ex ante
symmetric with i.i.d. clients. Potential gains from
trade are thus not so great for hotels. Second, a direct
allocation avoids the significant obstacles posed to
agents pursuing their allotments individually through
the market. Agents face substantial risk (price uncer-
tainty, exposure due to complementarities, unknown
hotel closing patterns), and this necessarily entails
some loss in expected allocation quality. For example,
the set of available hotels is sufficient to obtain trips
for all clients (albeit shortened from desired lengths),
and given a definite allocation, the agent can optimize
for its clients accordingly. With uncertainty, the agents
may plan for longer trips than are jointly feasible, and
thus wind up wasting flights, hoarding hotel rooms (to
hedge), or resorting to suboptimal fallback trip
options. In future work, we will investigate in greater
depth the various sources of misallocation in TAC
play.
9. Conclusions
The hallmark of Walverine’s approach is its basis
in competitive analysis of the TAC travel economy.
Walverine displays this characteristic most directly in
its use of Walrasian competitive equilibrium to predict
hotel prices, and its method for optimal bidding which
relies on the competitive property in its model of other
agent’s bids. The agent’s hotel and flight bidding
strategy is decision-analytic to the core, as every
action is based on an explicit optimization with
respect to its model assumptions.
As designers, we avoided empirical parameter
tuning, except in the case of entertainment bidding,
where we ceded all discretion to an automatic learning
procedure. (Admittedly, we exercised subjective judg-
ment in formulating the learning problem, inevitably
introducing some bias.) Our aim is to enable a sharper
evaluation of our fundamental hypothesis regarding
the utility of competitive analysis.
Table 3
The efficiency of the TAC market compared to the global optimum
Round Global TAC market TAC (%) Uniform H+E (%) Endowed E (%)
Qualify 618 415 67.0 95.2 85.4
Seeding 618 470 75.7 95.2 85.4
Semifinal 608 534 87.7 95.2 85.5
Final 609 542 89.1 94.6 85.0
Global optimization with uniform allocation of hotel and entertainment to agents is reported as a benchmark, as is a second benchmark with
uniform hotel allocation and no entertainment trading.
S.-F. Cheng et al. / Decision Support Systems 39 (2005) 169–184182
Although the results cannot be definitive, we
regard Walverine’s TAC-02 experience as broad val-
idation of its underlying approach. More focused
studies, e.g., on initial price prediction [24], are
needed to evaluate specific components of the agent’s
strategy. There is clearly room for improvement; in
particular, we have identified interim price prediction
and modeling for optimal bidding as areas where
Walverine fails to exploit available information. We
intend to pursue such topics in preparing for future
competitions in the TAC series.
As of this writing, TAC-03 is well underway. The
2003 tournament includes a division devoted to the
travel-shopping game described here (now dubbed
‘‘TAC Classic’’), as well as a new game involving
trading multifaceted goods in a supply-chain context.
This new game introduces several interesting strategic
issues not emphasized in TAC Classic. We hope that
many of the agent researchers interested in trading
domains will participate in one or both of these
games, and find it—as we have—a stimulating and
fertile environment for developing and evaluating
novel trading-agent techniques.
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